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The post-Mabo era was to be the age of reconciliation and the end of unjust dispossession of Indigenous peoples’ 
lands. However, as the more recent cases in native title show this vision did not become the reality. In this paper, I 
will examine Mabo in its historical context. In particular I will examine the claim that Mabo was a product of the 
‘new history’ movement in Australia. This movement developed in response to the silence that had shrouded the 
history of colonial relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples for most of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Through the writing of these histories, new historians have raised awareness of the history of colonization in 
Australia and the impact it has had on Indigenous peoples in particular. In the paper I will outline the ways in which 
Mabo is a product of this history. However, if Mabo did not bring to an end to the injustice and inequality facing 
Indigenous peoples in the context of land law in Australia, it is because of the traces of another history informing that 
decision and the events that followed it. In this paper I will refer to this history as the ‘old history’ of Australia. In 
this history Indigenous peoples are placed in a paradoxical position: they are inferior, but still seen as threat to the 
colonial enterprise. The paper will explore how this ‘history’ is repeated in Mabo and continues to inform the High 
Court’s approach to native title law. 
 
 
The post-Mabo era was to be the age of reconciliation and the end of unjust dispossession of 
Indigenous peoples’ lands. However, as the more recent cases in native title have shown, this has 
not become the reality. In this paper Mabo will be examined in its historical context. As part of 
the reconciliation movement, Mabo has been identified by some as a product of the ‘new history’ 
movement in Australia (Attwood 1996a). This movement developed in response to the silence 
that had shrouded the history of colonial relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples for most of the 19th and 20th centuries. Through the writing of these histories, the new 
historians have raised awareness of the history of colonization in Australia and the impact it has 
had on Indigenous peoples in particular. The first part of the paper will consider how Mabo may 
be understood in terms of this history. However, if Mabo did not bring an end to the injustice and 
inequality facing Indigenous peoples in the context of land law in Australia, this failure may be 
understood in terms of another version of history, which in this paper will be referred to as the 
‘old history’ of Australia. In this history Indigenous peoples are placed in a paradoxical position: 
they are inferior, but still seen as a threat to the colonial enterprise. The second half of the paper 
will explore how this ‘history’ may assist our understanding of the limitations of  the Mabo 
decision and of the more recent High Court cases in native title law, especially with respect to 
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their interpretation of the definition of native title in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’). By 
contrast to the reconciliatory sentiment that underlies Mabo and the new history movement that 
forms part of its background, the third part of the paper will examine the more recent 
developments in the case law. The paper will conclude by arguing that Mabo may have provided 
the potential impetus for change in the context of land rights in Australia, but that there are still 
many obstacles in the way of this change.  
 
Mabo and the New History Movement 
In Mabo for the first time in Australian law a form of Indigenous native title was found, not only 
to exist, but also to have predated and to have survived the acquisition of British sovereignty. The 
Court’s formulation was grounded in the common law: the common law recognized that native 
title survived the acquisition of British sovereignty over the Australian territories as a burden on 
the radical title of the Crown to the land. The content of native title, however, would arise from 
the traditions and customs of the Indigenous peoples themselves. In order to facilitate the 
common law recognition of native title, the Court first considered it necessary to reject the terra 
nullius doctrine as forming no part of Australian law. Whether in fact it was necessary for the 
Court to ‘reject’ the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ remains to be seen, especially since there had been no 
direct authorities in Australian common law declaring the Australian territories to be ‘terra 
nullius’ in those precise terms (Ritter 1996). Even so, if the Court found that the ‘terra nullius 
doctrine’ had operated to deny any Indigenous rights to land, it may be because of the 
characterization of Australia at the time of first settlement as a land belonging to no one. This 
legal characterization had found support in a line of judicial pronouncements that declared the 
continent to be in effect ‘desert and uncultivated’ at the time of British settlement, and provided 
the framework in which colonization was legitimized (Deane and Gaudron JJ in Mabo, 1992, at 
102-4). Thus, even in the absence of direct authorities claiming the Australian territories to be 
terra nullius, the authorities that supported the ‘discourse of terra nullius’ (Ritter 1996, p. 13) may 
have led the Court to come to the conclusion that the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ must be overcome in 
order for native title to be recognized in Australian law. 
 
Notwithstanding this error, when the authorities treating Australia as ‘desert and uncultivated’ (in 
effect ‘terra nullius’) were translated to the Indigenous inhabitants, the effect was that they were 
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deemed to be still living in a state of nature: with no laws, no organized society and no culture. 
By contrast, the Court’s rejection of the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ was in effect an acknowledgement 
that the Indigenous inhabitants did belong to organized societies with their own laws and 
customs. In this way the apparent change in the law can be explained in terms of changed 
perceptions of Indigenous peoples. Ultimately, this change in perception depended on a change in 
values. For Brennan J the common law of Australia could not remain ‘frozen in an age of racial 
discrimination’ (Mabo, 1992, at 42), but could be modified to reflect changed contemporary 
notions of justice and human rights, as manifested in part by international law and the common 
law as it has developed in other common law countries. Thus, from a legal perspective we can 
understand the decision in Mabo as finally aligning Australian jurisprudence in relation to native 
title law with developments in international and Australian domestic law (most notably the 
rejection of the terra nullius doctrine by the International Court of Justice in Western Sahara 
(Advisory Opinion) and the enactment in Australia of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
(‘RDA’)). We can also understand the High Court’s decision in Mabo as bringing Australian law 
into line with developments in countries such as Canada and the United States. It had already 
become evident after Blackburn J’s judgment in Milirrpum v Nabalco that Australia was lagging 
behind in this area. Notwithstanding the extent to which jurisdictions elsewhere had extended 
legal recognition to traditional titles to land, Blackburn J in Milirrpum rejected the claim for 
native title in that case on the basis that ‘the doctrine does not form, and never has formed, part of 
the law of any part of Australia’ (Milirrpum, 1971, at 141).  
 
However, even at the time of the decision in Milirrpum there was an evident disjuncture between 
Blackburn J’s final determination and his own perception of the Indigenous claimant groups in 
that case. Indeed Blackburn J accepted the evidence that showed the claimants: 
 
had a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the people led their lives, 
which provided a stable order of society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal 
whim or influence. If ever a system could be called ‘a government of laws, and not of men’, it is 
that shown in the evidence before me (Milirrpum, 1971, at 267). 
 
The evident discrepancy between fact and law in this case is clear:  
 
the Indigenous claimants were found to be socially organized with their own system of laws and 
government that predated the British arrival, yet there was no legal acknowledgement of that fact. 
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It was only in Mabo that this gap was finally bridged through the legal recognition of native title 
in that case (Dominello 2008a, p. 172). 
 
But while the decision in Mabo reflects a change in the perception of Indigenous peoples and is 
overtly critical of the colonial practices, policies and laws that contributed to their dispossession 
in the first place, these developments can be understood more broadly in terms of the work of the 
new historians in the latter half of the 20th century. For instance in Mabo Deane and Gaudron JJ 
declared: 
 
If this were any ordinary case, the Court would not be justified in reopening the validity of 
fundamental propositions which have been endorsed by long-established authority and which have 
been accepted as a basis of the real property law of the country for more than one hundred and 
fifty years … Far from being ordinary, however, the circumstances of the present case make it 
unique (Mabo, 1992, at 109). 
 
Arguably, if Mabo was no ordinary case then it should be seen as more than just a simple 
‘correction of a local anomaly’ (Nettheim 1993, p. 18), bringing Australia into line with the 
developments that had occurred elsewhere in the common law world. While it may be true that 
Mabo was not a ‘judicial revolution’, but a mere ‘cautious correction to Australian law’ 
(Nettheim 1993, p. 2), there was something much more profound motivating the Court in Mabo 
‘to change the law’ in a way that may only be explained by reference to its broader historical 
context. Thus, it is one of the contentions of this paper that in order to fully understand the 
Court’s decision in Mabo we must look beyond the pre-existing legal framework that the Court 
drew upon to support its decision, and acknowledge its broader historical context – and, in 
particular, the writing of Australian histories from the late 1960s onwards – as contributing to the 
impetus for change (in law and in society) that culminated in (among other things) the Mabo 
decision.  
 
There are four significant ways in which the new history writing of the time may be seen as 
important to the decision in Mabo. First, it is important to acknowledge the role of 
anthropologists such as WEH Stanner who made the call to break the silence surrounding the 
history of dispossession in Australia in the late 1960s (Stanner 1969). In a similar vein, the Court 
can also be seen as actively engaging in the process of breaking the silence surrounding the 
history of colonial relations in Australia. This was conveyed most forcefully in the joint judgment 
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of Deane and Gaudron JJ through their ‘acknowledgement of, and retreat from … past injustices’ 
(Mabo, 1992, at 109) experienced by Indigenous peoples in Australia – the dispossession of their 
lands. This sentiment directly echoes the sentiment of the new historians – a ‘sense of dis-ease’ 
about the silence that had shrouded colonial history in Australia, and a motivation to come to 
terms with this history in order to overcome it (Attwood 1996a, p. xxix). For new historians ‘the 
continuing colonial crime’ was to keep locked the ‘cupboard of our history’ (Smith 1981, p. 26). 
The forgetfulness surrounding the history of dispossession was the ‘moral issue central to the 
nation’s existence’ (Smith 1981, p. 17) and continued to pose ‘a central problem for the integrity 
and authenticity of Australia’ (Smith 1981, p. 45). Similarly for Deane and Gaudron JJ there was 
a recognition in their judgment that ‘[t]he acts and events by which that dispossession in legal 
theory was carried into practical effect constitute the darkest aspect of the history of this nation’; 
and that only by overcoming this history (through rejection of the terra nullius doctrine) could a 
‘diminished’ nation find salvation (Mabo, 1992, at 109). Just as the new historians had 
recognized that Indigenous peoples had been exposed to serious injustices through colonization, 
so too had the Court, and in Mabo the Court took the opportunity to do something about it.  
 
Secondly, insofar as the new historians have engaged in the writing of colonial history, the work 
of Henry Reynolds has proved most influential – not least in the Mabo decision itself. Reynolds 
himself has acknowledged his own contribution to the decision in various places (Reynolds 1992, 
pp. 185-202, Reynolds 1993), and his influence is acknowledged by others (Ritter 1996, p. 29; 
Briscoe 1993, pp. 4-5; Hughes and Pitty 1994, p. 13). Most importantly there are references to his 
work in the actual judgments (Deane and Gaudron JJ, in Mabo, at 107, 142; Toohey J, in Mabo, 
at 181). And it has been argued that it was Reynolds’ analysis of the terra nullius doctrine as 
standing in the way of legal recognition of native title that compelled the Court to reject it in the 
first place (Ritter 1996, p. 29). In other words, if the Court made an error by perceiving the terra 
nullius doctrine as having operated to deny the recognition of native title in Australia, that error 
could be traced back to Reynolds’ research as he had been the one to launch the term ‘into 
mainstream public debate’ (Ritter 1996, p. 27). As Ritter has described it: ‘Reynolds turned the 
dispossession of Aboriginal People into a “legal” event, in the sense of an event recognised as 
traceable to the operation of a legal general rule’ (Ritter 1996, p. 29). 
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More significantly, however, Reynolds’ work had revealed that there had not been a wholesale 
extinguishment of native title, but that in early colonial times the Colonial Office had recognized 
the Indigenous occupants’ legal interest in the land, and had tried to protect it in 1846 by an Order 
in Council – which in Reynolds’ view ‘was a clear and demonstrable recognition of native title: 
the right to use and occupy land held under traditional title’ (Reynolds 1987, p. 139). In this 
regard Reynolds’ analysis of legal history was at odds with Blackburn J’s conclusions in 
Milirrpum, and was crucial in raising awareness of the need to correct the law in this area. 
Indeed, if Reynolds’ view is accepted, then the law had always recognized Indigenous peoples’ 
native title rights and interests to their traditional lands: it was the settlers and successive 
governments, jurists and historians that had got it wrong.  
 
Reynolds’ historical work had found traces of earlier attempts to protect native title, although 
those attempts had failed until Mabo. But if Mabo was an attempt at recovering this lost history, 
it was also an attempt to recover Aboriginal history. In the writing of new history the new 
historians not only recovered long forgotten facts of colonial history, but created a space for the 
writing/speaking of Aboriginal histories. Thus, the third contribution of the new histories to 
Australian history writing that came to be reflected in Mabo was the valorization of Aboriginal 
history. This is most evident in the Court’s acceptance of the perception of Indigenous peoples as 
having their own laws and social systems as a basis for ‘rejecting’ the terra nullius doctrine and 
extending legal recognition to native title. Moreover, the content of native title was to emanate 
from the Indigenous claimants themselves. In this regard the oral testimonies of the claimants that 
related to proof of custom, otherwise termed ‘traditional evidence’, were accepted by the trial 
judge, and in turn by the High Court in the final proceedings, as supporting the claimants’ 
contentions concerning the survival and nature of their rights and interests to land (Keon-Cohen 
1993, pp. 195-7). Importantly, as in the writing of history, Indigenous peoples were seen as 
engaged in the process – as active agents in history and in law. 
 
This brings us to the fourth contribution made by the more recent history writing to the Mabo 
decision. According to more traditional approaches to historical methodology the writing of 
history entails maintaining strict delineations between past and present (and future): 
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so long as scientific methods are adopted, it is possible for the historian and the archaeologist to 
show the past as it really was and to understand it on its own terms, and thus have independent, 
historical truth (Attwood 1996a, p. xvi). 
 
This approach assumes ‘a radical disjunction between past and present,’ treating the past as 
‘complete, unchanging and unchangeable,’ and as having an objective existence (Attwood 1996a, 
p. xx). By contrast, a cluster of ‘new’ historians have rejected the idea that it is possible to write 
history in terms of such strict distinctions between past and present. Instead, they take the view 
that ‘one always reaches the past “by starting out from the present,” and is “always concerned 
with the meanings of historical reality for us, now”’, for it is how the past is interpreted now that 
will shape the future (Attwood 1996a, p. xvii). According to this approach, the writing of history 
is performed within the historical context of the present, and its content is informed by the 
interpretive framework of the historian.   
 
The acceptance of Indigenous peoples’ accounts of history, both in historical works and in the 
law, illuminates how the historical record may be revised and how such revisions may influence 
change in the law. The acceptance by the High Court of the claimants’ evidence in Mabo 
supported their contentions concerning the survival and nature of their rights and interests to land, 
and located the source of those rights and interests in their traditional laws and customs. 
Moreover, by changing the law through acceptance of the pre-existing property rights of 
Indigenous peoples, and by rejecting what Brennan J described as the ‘barbarian’ theory of law in 
response to contemporary values (Mabo, 1992, at 39), Mabo not only represented a shift in the 
basis for interpreting Australian history by acknowledging the relevance of Aboriginal traditions, 
but took its place in the broader developing tradition of a history of reconciliation – the end of the 
age of racial discrimination in Australia: a sentiment also conveyed in the judgment of Deane and 
Gaudron JJ (Mabo, 1992, at 109). 
 
Admittedly, while the approach in Mabo conforms to the historiographical methodology of the 
new history movement, it is also true that in any event it is an accepted methodological approach 
of the common law to modify the law where its presuppositions no longer reflect current social 
standards – which is in effect the approach that was taken in Mabo. Reflecting on the 
methodology of the common law, Jeremy Webber has noted: 
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It is a much more active process of probing for what is valuable in our past, cherishing what we 
take to be important, refining it, and basing our further growth and reflection upon it – all 
elements of a sophisticated grappling with precedent. Respect for precedent involves modesty – a 
sense that we can and should learn from our own community’s past – but it also involves a critical 
element, in which we actively engage our past, drawing lessons for the future. At times, reflection 
upon our past (including reflection upon where our community now seems to be moving) leads us 
to question prior assumptions. We can come to the conclusion that elements that once seemed 
central to our society are now out of step with, perhaps even antagonistic to, our most cherished 
commitments (Webber 1995, p. 25).  
 
Importantly, the focus of revision in cases such as Mabo is not merely an interpretive reading of 
the past, but demonstrates concern for what should be done in the present to chart ‘a future course 
that accords better with what we take to be good in our community’s experience’ (Webber 1995, 
p. 10). As Webber has pointed out, the issue in Mabo ‘was not about some action or defect of the 
remote past’: 
 
The defect was very much alive within the law, its application in question today. Often, people 
presume that Indigenous title is about dispossession long ago. Usually, however, the dispossession 
is much more recent, often happening in the present. That was certainly the case with Mabo. The 
Meriam people were still living on their land. They had maintained an unbroken occupation since 
time immemorial. The court had to decide whether they had a right to that land or whether they 
were mere sojourners, subject to removal at the government’s whim. If dispossession occurred, it 
would not be in 1788 or in 1879. It would effectively be now, in 1992, by virtue of the judges’ 
action. While the previous cases might be old, it was their present operation, at the end of the 20th 
century that was in issue. The problem was not one of correcting an ancient injustice, but whether 
Australian law still took indigenous land, paying no heed to the present inhabitants . . . (Webber 
1995, pp. 25-6). 
 
Yet, according to the more orthodox view of history and law, dispossession would have already 
occurred in 1788 (in the case of New South Wales) or 1789 (in the case of Queensland where the 
proceedings in Mabo arose) with the acquisition of British sovereignty over the Australian 
territories, notwithstanding the changed circumstances of the present. Indeed, this had been the 
approach taken by Dawson J (dissenting) in Mabo. Needless to say if this view had prevailed the 
course of Australian history would have been undeniably different and, from a social justice point 
of view, all the worse for Indigenous peoples and for the nation as a whole.  
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Thus, apart from the developments in the law that the Court relied upon to legitimize its decision 
in Mabo, the decision can also be understood in terms of the new history writing that had 
emerged in the decades leading up to the decision, providing versions of Australian history 
alternative to those that had consciously excluded the impact of colonialism on Indigenous 
peoples. The Court adopted a similar approach in its recognition of the impact of colonial laws 
and policies on the Indigenous inhabitants – which, as Brennan J put it, had made them ‘intruders 
in their own homes and mendicants for a place to live’ (Mabo, 1992, at 29). Thus, the Mabo 
decision demonstrates judicial acceptance of the changing ‘truths’ about Indigenous peoples and 
their societies, and acknowledgement of the significant role played by law, and state policies and 
practices, in undermining their continued survival in Australia. These were truths that had already 
become apparent through developments in the new history movement; but the significance of 
Mabo was that it also gave those developments legal effect. The rejection of the ‘terra nullius 
doctrine’ was the discursive means by which the Court sought to address the past injustices and 
discrimination experienced by Indigenous inhabitants, to acknowledge the pre-existing legal 
systems of the Indigenous inhabitants, and thus to secure a more legitimate foundation for 
Australian property law by acknowledging that native title had survived the acquisition of British 
sovereignty.  
 
For some this was an indication that Mabo signalled the potential transformation of the nation by 
providing a new foundation for the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples 
in Australia, based on equality of treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous property interests. 
This potential was itself a product of history and reflects acceptance of the ‘new Australian 
history as an interpretation of Australia’s colonial past [and Australia’s present and future]’ 
(Attwood 1996a, p. vii). In this way Mabo was not only a turning point in the direction towards 
reconciliation, but could also be located on the trajectory of the reconciliation movement in law 
and society. Mabo was itself a reconciliatory event, but was also the product of a history of 
reconciliation, or what has been termed the ‘new history of Australia’. Unfortunately, 
developments in the context of native title law have demonstrated that much more needs to be 
done in order to make the end of dispossession and discrimination a reality in the legal context. 
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Mabo: Australia’s Past, Present and Future 
If the historians in colonial times had come to forget that colonial Australian history involved 
relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, it was because at least by the latter 
half of the 19th century it had become accepted that Indigenous peoples were not subjects in 
Australian history, but objects of scientific study. In this ‘old history’ it was first naturalism and 
then Social Darwinism that came to dominate the way in which Indigenous peoples were 
perceived through the eyes of the European colonizers. Naturalism supported the creation of a 
hierarchical relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples: perceived as hunter 
gatherers Indigenous peoples were thought to be still in a state of nature – assigned to pre-history, 
and therefore outside history altogether (Davies, 2002, 261-5). When Social Darwinism replaced 
naturalism it continued to perpetuate the hierarchical relationship between the colonizers and 
colonized. It was in this period that ‘race’ clearly became a classifying tool, used not only to 
distinguish between races, but to place different races at different levels on the scale of 
civilization, with Indigenous peoples at the bottom. Insofar as these theories came to inform the 
laws and policies relating to Indigenous peoples they would in turn legitimize inequality of 
treatment of Indigenous peoples, justify the removal of Indigenous children from their 
communities and make more land available for non-Indigenous usages. However, the ill effects of 
colonization on Indigenous peoples were not seen as the consequences of those practices and 
policies, but as the natural consequences of their inferiority and inability to match the western 
forces of civilization. Social Darwinism predicted the eventual demise of the Aboriginal race and 
when that did not become the reality, governments tried to ensure that it would through social 
engineering. The eventual failure of Social Darwinism would lead to the adoption of 
assimilationist policies based on anthropological perceptions of Indigenous peoples as capable of 
being absorbed within the broader mainstream Australian society.  
 
Throughout these periods of colonization the supposed inferiority of Indigenous peoples (and the 
corresponding superiority of the European colonizers) seemed irreconcilable with the threat that 
Indigenous peoples appeared to pose to the colonizing processes. A classic example of this 
paradox can be found in a statement made in 1937 by the second Chief Protector of Aborigines in 
Western Australia, AO Neville, during discussions of the growing ‘Aboriginal problem’ that was 
then facing the states and territories : 
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the native population is increasing. What is to be the limit? Are we going to have a 
population of 1,000,000 blacks in the Commonwealth, or are we going to merge them into 
our white community and eventually forget that there ever were any Aborigines in 
Australia? (Commonwealth of Australia 1937, p. 11).1
 
  
Interestingly, it was the anthropologists, notably Elkin, who in the first half of the 20th century 
found that Indigenous peoples did in fact have a culture: ‘a social, economic, legal, political and 
religious organization by which they are able to adapt themselves to their geographical and social 
environment’ (Elkin 1934, p. 15). At the time, the anthropologists may have provided the 
scientific basis for the adoption of the policy of assimilation. Nevertheless, it is clear that it was 
their perception of Aboriginality that came to inform the High Court decision in Mabo, 
particularly in the Court’s recognition of native title and its corresponding acknowledgement that 
Indigenous peoples do have systems of laws and societies. Thus, while in its original context 
anthropological constructions of Aboriginality purported to advance the understanding that 
Indigenous peoples could be absorbed into white Australian society (in this sense Aboriginality 
was still seen in negative terms requiring further negation), in Mabo such a construction was 
applied in positive terms – as a positive recognition of difference. 
 
However, this construction of Aboriginality has not proven to be unproblematic. The problem 
with the anthropological construction, as with all the other colonial constructions of 
Aboriginality, is that Aboriginality is perceived as timeless and homogenous, reflecting the 
natural differences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. For the early 
anthropologists like Elkin, once the traits that were proof of Aboriginality were exposed to and 
tainted by British civilization, it was thought they were lost forever. This understanding has also 
come to inform developments in the native title context. 
 
Since Mabo there have been numerous High Court decisions in the area of native title. Of these 
the decisions in Yorta Yorta and Ward are two of the most significant as they set out the Court’s 
understanding of the definition of native title contained in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) 
(‘NTA’), which now governs this area of law. According to section 223(1) of the NTA ‘native 
title’ is defined as: 
                                                 
1 For an earlier account of this phenomenon see Morris 1992. 
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the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, 
and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders; and 
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, 
have a connection with the land or waters; and 
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
 
In Yorta Yorta Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ, in a joint majority judgment in the High 
Court, dismissed the claimants’ appeal against orders rejecting their native title claim over their 
ancestral lands that lie across the border of Victoria and New South Wales. The critical issue 
involved the effect of the ‘adaptation and change’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 449) that had occurred to 
the claimant group and their relationship to the claimed lands as a result of colonization. The 
claimants’ argument was that their ‘society, whose laws and customs had adapted and changed 
over time, continued to exist and … continued to occupy the claim area, or large parts of it, from 
before European settlement to the date of the claim’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 449). The resolution of 
this issue depended on the joint judgment’s interpretation of the word ‘traditional’ in section 
223(1)(a) as it relates to ‘the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, 
by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders’.  
 
In support of the claim it was argued that the reference to traditional laws and customs in section 
223(1) should be interpreted in the present tense so that they relate to ‘traditional laws currently 
acknowledged and currently observed’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 424):  
 
Section 223(1) does not require that they be the same as those which existed prior to sovereignty. 
… A requirement of positive proof of continuous observance and acknowledgment by each 
generation of ancestors of the claimant group would impose an impossible burden of proof. Such 
an approach would not allow for adaptation and change. No judgment in Mabo v Queensland [No 
2] went so far (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 424). 
 
The High Court disagreed. For the purposes of interpreting ‘traditional’ as it relates to the 
traditional laws and customs referred to in the NTA, the joint judgment took as its starting point 
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the understanding that ‘the origins of the content’ of these traditional laws and customs ‘are to be 
found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander societies that existed 
before the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown. It is only those normative rules that are 
“traditional” laws and customs’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 444). Moreover, their Honours found that 
the NTA requires ‘that the normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed 
(the traditional laws and customs) is a system that has had a continuous existence and vitality 
since sovereignty’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 444). The continued existence of this ‘body of norms’ 
(Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 445) depended on an inquiry into whether the society of the claimant group 
had continued to acknowledge and observe those laws and customs. Thus, in the context of native 
title the change of sovereignty meant that ‘the only native title rights or interests in relation to 
land or waters which the new sovereign order recognised were those that existed at the time of 
change in sovereignty. Although those rights survived the change in sovereignty, if new rights or 
interests were to arise, those new rights and interests must find their roots in the legal order of the 
new sovereign power’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 447). Thus, a native title determination requires us 
to conduct an inquiry 
 
about the relationship between the laws and customs now acknowledged and observed, and those 
that were acknowledged and observed before sovereignty, and to do so by considering whether the 
laws and customs can be said to be the laws and customs of the society whose laws and customs 
are properly described as traditional laws and customs (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 447).  
 
However, the joint judgment did concede that ‘some change to, or adaptation of, traditional law 
or custom or some interruption of enjoyment or exercise of native title rights or interests in the 
period between the Crown asserting sovereignty and the present will not necessarily be fatal to a 
native title claim’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 454; see also 443). How much adaptation or interruption 
would be acceptable was not entirely clear.2
 
 On the issue of adaptation the joint judgment found 
it was a ‘question’ of whether 
the law and custom can still be seen to be traditional law and traditional custom. Is the change or 
adaptation of such a kind that it can no longer be said that the rights or interests asserted are 
possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed by the 
relevant peoples …? (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 455).  
 
                                                 
2 But see, eg, Western Australia v Sebastian [2008] FCAFC 65 (2 May 2008).  
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On the issue of interruption the joint judgment was of the view that a claimant group must 
establish that ‘acknowledgment and observance of those laws and customs must have continued 
substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 456). This was a necessary 
requirement as 
 
the rights and interests which are said now to be possessed must nonetheless be rights and 
interests possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed 
by the peoples in question. Further, the connection which the peoples concerned have with the 
land or waters must be shown to be a connection by their traditional laws and customs. … Were 
that not so, the laws and customs acknowledged and observed now could not properly be 
described as the traditional laws and customs of the peoples concerned (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 
456).  
 
The limitation of native title recognition to only those rights and interests that were in existence at 
the time of the change in sovereignty, and the requirement that the acknowledgement and 
observance of ‘traditional’ laws and customs be ‘substantially uninterrupted’ as proof of 
continued connection to ancestral lands, reinforce ‘old’ colonial constructions of Aboriginality – 
the essentialized image of untainted Aboriginality found in anthropologism and the image of the 
dying race found in Social Darwinism. On this approach the joint judgment in Yorta Yorta could 
not take into account the impact that colonization had on the members of the claimant group 
through which they survived; rather the impact was proof of their own demise. The approach 
could not really accommodate the idea that a society’s traditional laws and customs may have 
evolved over time to become the laws and customs that the group currently acknowledges and 
observes in relation to their land and waters. Indeed, according to the logic of the joint majority 
judgment, the claimants’ ‘society which had once observed traditional laws and customs had 
ceased to do so and, by ceasing to do so, no longer constituted the society out of which the 
traditional laws and customs sprang’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 458). 
 
However, the emphasis that the joint judgment placed on the date of the acquisition of 
sovereignty as pre-determining the native title rights and interests that the Court could recognise 
as ‘traditional’ under section 223(1) of the NTA may also be understood as an inevitable 
consequence of some of the unresolved issues in Mabo. However much each of the majority 
judges in Mabo appeared committed to change the law in a way that would benefit Indigenous 
peoples they could not undo one fact of Australian history – the acquisition of the Australian 
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territories by the British Crown. The legal consequences of this fact are still being felt today. In 
Mabo the rejection of terra nullius may have paved the way for legal recognition of native title, 
but this was not matched by the legal recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty. Indeed if the 
decision in Mabo had in fact involved a need to reject the ‘terra nullius doctrine’, the Australian 
territories would have been reclassified as either ‘ceded’ or ‘conquered’. In that case the 
settlement thesis upon which the classification of the Australian territories is based would have 
become obsolete and the sovereignty of the peoples in pre-existing occupation would have been 
acknowledged (although the existing laws could be subject to modification or replacement by the 
Crown or by Parliament) (Dominello 2008a, p. 176). In fact what did happen in Mabo was that 
the Court gave legal recognition to a concept of Indigenous property that had its origins in 
Indigenous customary laws (as evident in the Court’s insistence that the content of native title 
was to emanate from the Indigenous claimants themselves), but continued to take it for granted 
that within the native title regime Indigenous peoples must continue to look to non-Indigenous 
institutions for the protection of their native title rights and interests. In Mabo the Court may have 
given legal recognition to changed perceptions of Indigenous peoples, but the power to make this 
decision and the framework for deciding native title claims in the future remained squarely within 
the hands of Australian legal institutions – not Indigenous ones.  
 
Significantly in Mabo Brennan J had found that ‘Native title, though recognised by the common 
law, is not an institution of the common law’ (Mabo, 1992, at 59): an understanding that has been 
subsequently accepted by the Court in its interpretation of native title under the NTA. However, 
the corollary of this reasoning is that Australian laws have their origins in the English law. The 
effect of maintaining such a distinction based on the difference between the origins of Australian 
laws and native title has been to reclassify racial differences between ‘Australians’ and 
Indigenous peoples. Where once distinctions were drawn between the personal traits of the 
British (and now Australians) and Indigenous peoples, distinctions in the native title context are 
being drawn on the basis of the differences in the legal origins of their respective laws. However, 
if the Court has continued to draw these distinctions it has been seen as a necessary step to 
preserve the acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown and the Australian legal system that 
originated from that act. In Mabo the Court itself held that the acquisition cannot be challenged in 
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a municipal court (Brennan J in Mabo, 1992, at 31). In Yorta Yorta the joint majority judgment 
went even further: 
 
the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown necessarily entailed … that there could 
thereafter be no parallel law-making system in the territory over which it asserted 
sovereignty. To hold otherwise would be to deny the acquisition of sovereignty and … that 
is not permissible (Yorta Yorta at 422, 443-4).  
 
Whether the Crown requires such protection remains to be seen. Paradoxically what can be seen 
in the developments in native title is the perceived difference in origins of Australian law in 
English law, and native title in Aboriginal customary law, has left native title vulnerable to 
inferior treatment – the regrettable legacy of the colonial enterprise. This is nowhere more 
obvious than in Ward.  
 
The native title claim in Ward related to the region known as the East Kimberleys, and covered 
lands and waters in northern parts of Western Australia (the Miriuwung and Gajerrong claim) and 
adjacent lands in the Northern Territory (the Ningarmara claim). Because there were competing 
rights and interests in the claimed land, the issue of whether native title rights and interests could 
be subject to partial extinguishment, and the general principles applicable to the issue of 
extinguishment, were crucial. However, in order to determine those issues, it was first necessary 
to consider what exactly might be subject to extinguishment; that is, the nature of native title as 
defined by the NTA.  
 
On this issue, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong claimants submitted that the ‘occupation approach’ 
that Lee J had applied at first instance, should be adopted and that the ‘bundle of rights’ approach 
subsequently taken by the majority of the Full Federal Court should be rejected in this case. 
According to a ‘bundle of rights’ approach, native title rights and interests are severable from 
each other. As thus understood, native title as a ‘bundle of rights’ is susceptible to partial 
extinguishment, However, as a title based on occupation, it is not. 
 
In relation to the definition of native title in the NTA the claimants submitted that they  
 
through their predecessor community, occupied exclusively the determination area so that then, as 
now, they hold a right to exclusive possession. It is a “community title” which is practically 
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“equivalent to full ownership”. This conclusion is justified by the concept of “belonging to 
country”, evidenced by the findings of fact, and is supported by the judgment of Brennan J in 
Mabo [No 2] (Ward, 2002, at 10-11).  
 
This argument was based on Lee J’s judgment at first instance (and on the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v Queen (in right of British Columbia). Justice Lee 
had treated native title as a communal ‘right to land’ and had found in relation to the 
circumstances of this case that ‘the right … to “speak for” that land, in particular to “speak for” 
its use … justified the finding that there was possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the 
traditional homelands of the applicant group’ (Ward, 2002, at 11). In this way the claimants 
posited native title as analogous to a title in fee simple – as proprietary in nature: 
 
Passages in the judgment of Brennan J in Mabo [No 2] support the view that the interest of a 
community in exclusive possession of land is proprietary because there are no other proprietors. 
An identifiable community that was in exclusive possession of land, which is an identifiable 
community today and which observes customs that are traditionally based, has proprietary title 
(Ward, 2002, at 12).  
 
The High Court, however, rejected this conceptualisation of native title. In a joint judgment 
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ found that the change in sovereignty meant that 
the right to speak to country — ‘the right to be asked for permission to use or have access to the 
land — was inevitably confined, if not excluded’ (Ward, 2002, at 94). The change in sovereignty 
meant that new rights to control access to land were created. The rights of traditional occupiers to 
control access to the land may have been affected, but the joint judgment opined that ‘because 
native title is more than the right to be asked for permission to use or have access (important 
though that right undoubtedly is) there are other rights and interests which must be considered, 
including rights and interests in the use of the land’ (Ward, 2002, at 94). The joint majority 
judgment also stressed the requirement under section 223(1) of the NTA that the relevant native 
title rights and interests are only those ‘in relation to land or waters’: they are the ‘rights and 
interests which are “possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional 
customs observed”, by the relevant peoples’ and who ‘by those traditional laws and customs … 
“have a connection with” the land or waters in question’ (Ward, 2002, at 66). In this way, their 
Honours limited native title rights and interests to those arising out of the traditional laws and 
customs that demonstrated the claimant group’s connection to their lands and waters.  
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Overall, the joint judgment preferred the ‘bundle of rights’ approach to the occupation approach: 
 
It draws attention first to the fact that there may be more than one right or interest and secondly to 
the fact that there may be several kinds of rights and interests in relation to land that exist under 
traditional law and custom. Not all of those rights and interests may be capable of full or accurate 
expression as rights to control what others may do on or with the land (Ward, 2002, at 95).  
 
In turn the joint judgment rejected the occupation approach: 
 
The fact of occupation, taken by itself, says nothing of what traditional law or custom provided. 
Standing alone, the fact of occupation is an insufficient basis for concluding that there was what 
the primary judge referred to as “communal title in respect of the claim area” or a right of 
occupation of it (Ward, 2002, at 94).  
 
It follows from a ‘bundle of rights’ approach to the content of native title that native title rights 
and interests can be subject to partial extinguishment (Ward, 2002, at 89). In fact, the joint 
judgment found that certain provisions of the NTA ‘mandate entire and partial extinguishment’ 
(Ward, 2002, at 63). On this basis, they opined that it was not appropriate to view native title 
rights and interests as ‘a single set of rights relating to land that is analogous to a fee simple’ 
(Ward, 2002, at 91). To do so ‘assumes, rather than demonstrates, the nature of the rights and 
interests that are possessed under traditional law and custom’ (Ward, 2002, at 92). 
 
Their Honours, however, did not seem to rule out altogether claims for rights of control over 
traditional lands arising from the right to speak for country. However, in terms of the ‘bundle of 
rights’ approach, such a right could only be one among many of the rights that comprise native 
title. In fact, a determination under section 225(b) of the NTA is required to state ‘the nature and 
extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the determination area’; and for 
anything less than ‘a right, as against the whole world, to possession, occupation, use and 
enjoyment of land or waters’, their Honours opined that ‘it will seldom be appropriate, or 
sufficient, to express the nature and extent of the relevant native title rights and interests by using 
those terms’(Ward, 2002, at 82).3
                                                 
3 But see, eg, Neowarra v Western Australia [2004] FCA 1092 and Sampi v Western Australia (No 2) (2005) 224 
ALR 358. 
 When no such right of exclusive possession exists as native 
title, ‘it will be preferable to express the rights by reference to the activities that may be 
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conducted, as of right, on or in relation to the land or waters’ (Ward, 2002, at 83). Thus, in their 
view now that native title is governed by the NTA, native title could no longer be understood in 
terms of the common law developments in this area which had been the approach of Lee J at first 
instance. Furthermore, the majority’s construction in Ward of the connection which Indigenous 
peoples have with the land – ‘country’ – as essentially spiritual led them to question whether 
native title could ever amount to the same entitlements as under the common law (Ward, 2002, at 
65, 93).  
 
Adopting the ‘bundle of rights’ approach, the joint majority judgment confined its enquiry to 
those rights and interests of the claimant group that might demonstrate their connection to the 
claimed area. In this regard, the Court, agreeing with the Full Court majority, rejected the 
proposition that control of traditional cultural knowledge was a native title right: the ‘recognition’ 
of this right would extend beyond denial or control of access to land held under native title 
(Ward, 2002, at 84). According to the joint judgment, a connection must be made between the 
rights and interests claimed and the land in question. That connection was missing in relation to 
these rights. Such rights might involve, for example, the restraint of visual or auditory 
reproductions of what was to be found there or took place there, and this would fall outside the 
definition of native title rights and interests in the NTA (Ward, 2002, at 84).  
 
Furthermore, the right to use the resources on the land was limited to a right to use the traditional 
resources of the land. Thus it was held that no native title right or interest in minerals was 
established (Ward, 2002, at 185-6).4
                                                 
4 Even if they had established traditional rights to these resources, the provisions in the Mining Act 1904 (WA) and 
the Petroleum Act 1936 (WA) had extinguished those rights, at least in relation to the claim over parts of Western 
Australia). 
 Moreover, the bundle of rights approach to native title 
supported the application of the ‘inconsistency of rights’ test for extinguishment. As applied to 
various parts of the claimed land, the joint judgment found that the claimants’ rights of 
controlling access to these areas and making decisions about them had been extinguished, 
although that did not necessarily extinguish all aspects of native title (Ward, 2002, at 190-8 in 
relation to the pastoral lease in the Northern Territory; at 138 in respect of the reservation of land 
for public purposes; at 157-70 in respect of mining leases). Notably, such a dissection of the 
20  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 
claimants’ rights would not have been possible if the occupation approach had been adopted (Lee 
J in Ward, 1998, at 508-10, North J in Ward, 2000, at 516). 
 
It is evident from the joint majority judgment in Ward that a stark contrast between Indigenous 
law and Australian law effectively meant that common law property precepts could not be used to 
give substance to Indigenous peoples’ conceptions of property (Ward, 2002, at 65). In any event 
their understanding of the operation of the NTA appears to have precluded any alternative 
approach to native title based on common law conceptualizations of native title. However, it is 
also important to acknowledge how the joint judgment established support for its reasoning on 
the basis of the nature of the relationship between Indigenous societies and their traditional lands. 
Indeed, the joint majority judgment found that the relationship between Indigenous peoples’ and 
their ‘country’ was essentially spiritual, and this led them to question whether native title could 
ever amount to the same entitlement as a common law property title (Ward, 2002, at 93). Again, 
this was reminiscent of the ahistorical Aborigine of anthropologism that had been accepted by 
Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco as ‘the fundamental truth about the aboriginals’ relationship 
to the land’ (Ward, 2002, at 64). 
 
The reasoning of the joint majority judgment in Ward suggests that the spiritual nature of the 
connection that Indigenous peoples have to their lands precludes its construction and treatment as 
a common law property right (Ward, 2002, at 65). One may perhaps wonder why the Court found 
it necessary to draw such distinctions and not to rely solely on the terms of the NTA. However, by 
adopting this approach, the majority judgment appeared to accept a tacit distinction between the 
spiritual (Indigenous conceptions of property) and the economic (non-Indigenous conception of 
property).5
                                                 
5 See also Callinan J in Ward, 2002, at 395-7. 
 It would appear that such distinctions are reason enough to treat native title as an 
inferior property entitlement. The Court may have tried to construe this distinction as an 
inevitable consequence of the operation of the NTA, but it cannot really conceal its own role in 
continuing to perpetuate such differences. Indeed if non-Indigenous property rights are superior it 
is because they have been made so in the Australian legal context. The result is that Indigenous 
peoples are clearly being discriminated against on the basis of race and the perceived differences 
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in their conceptions of property that arise from racial differences: there is nothing inevitable 
about it.  
 
Mabo and the (Post)-Colonial Legacy 
The decisions in Yorta Yorta and Ward show that there still has not been an end to the history of 
the dispossession and discrimination. Mabo could be seen as a product of new history writing, but 
it is equally true that the developments in native title law have seen a return to some of the old 
ways of seeing Indigenous peoples. It is no wonder that when native title claims have failed there 
are claims made that the terra nullius doctrine continues to pervade Australian law: Indigenous 
peoples may continue to maintain connections to their ancestral lands, but their presence on the 
Australian landscape continues to be denied. It may be that in Mabo that both ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
approaches to history coexist, but that ultimately it was the spirit of reconciliation that triumphed 
in that case. Regrettably, this spirit may have dwindled in the more recent case law.  
 
A significant aspect of the new history movement was to break the silence surrounding the 
history of colonial relations in Australia. An important aspect of these histories (although by no 
means their sole focus (Veracini 2003)) was to illuminate the injustices that Indigenous peoples 
have experienced during this history. The reconciliatory tone set by Brennan J in his appeals to 
bring Australian laws into conformity with contemporary notions of justice and human rights, and 
by Deane and Gaudron JJ in their appeals to correct the law and overcome a legacy of grave 
historical injustices for Indigenous peoples, accord with this historical approach. But they are in 
stark contrast to the judgments in Yorta Yorta and Ward. Notably at first instance in Yorta Yorta, 
Olney J was of the view that there was not  
 
any warrant within the Native Title Act 1912 [sic] for the Court to play the role of social engineer, 
righting the wrongs of past centuries and dispensing justice according to contemporary notions of 
political correctness rather than according to law. … [T]his case is not about righting the wrongs 
of the past, rather it has a very narrow focus directed to determining whether native title rights and 
interests … have survived to be recognised and enforced under the contemporary law of Australia 
(Yorta Yorta, 1998, at [17], [21]).  
 
Furthermore, by contrast to the judgment of Deane and Gaudron JJ in Mabo, with its 
acknowledgment of the impact of colonization and attempt to address and retreat from past 
injustices, in Ward such aspirations have been construed as beyond the reach of the courts to 
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achieve. In Ward, in even stronger language than that used by Deane and Gaudron JJ in Mabo, 
McHugh J acknowledged that: 
 
at least on occasions the dominant class in a society will use its power to disregard the rights of a 
class or classes with less power. On any view, that is what the dominant classes in Australian 
society did – and in the eyes of many still do – to the Aboriginal people (Ward, 2002, at 231). 
 
Unlike Deane and Gaudron JJ, however, he questioned the role that the Court and the present 
legal system could play in remedying such injustice – observing that: 
 
redress cannot be achieved by a system that depends on evaluating the competing legal rights of 
landholders and native-title holders. The deck is stacked against the native-title holders whose 
fragile rights must give way to the superior rights of the landholders whenever the two classes of 
rights conflict. And it is a system that is costly and time-consuming. At present the chief 
beneficiaries of the system are the legal representatives of the parties. It may be that the time has 
come to think of abandoning the present system (Ward, 2002, at 240-41). 
 
Until the system is changed, however, it is clear that the law of native title in Australia is 
governed by the statute (McHugh J in Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 467). 
 
Ultimately, the result in Yorta Yorta has seen a return to the silencing of Aboriginal history and 
the impact that colonial history has had on Indigenous peoples and of the need for remedial relief 
of this impact. In the High Court the joint majority judgment endorsed the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the claimant group’s adherence to traditional laws and customs was irrevocably 
severed sometime in the late 19th century. This conclusion was largely based on the claimant 
group’s traditional laws and customs as reflected in the written work of Edward Curr, a 19th 
pastoralist, and not on the oral testimonies of the claimants’ own connection to their traditional 
lands. The joint judgment also specifically endorsed the trial judge’s conclusion that an 
Aboriginal petition in 1881, protesting that ‘the government and white settlers’ had taken 
possession of ‘all the land within our tribal boundaries’, could be used as ‘“positive evidence 
emanating from the Aboriginals themselves” to the effect that the descendants of those who had 
originally occupied the land no longer continued to acknowledge their traditional laws or observe 
their traditional customs’ (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Yorta Yorta, at 450). The 
petition had originally been tendered by the claimants to demonstrate their history of survival and 
resistance, by showing that they had continued to struggle for land throughout the period of 
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colonization. The distortion of the intention of the petition by the courts effectively turned the 
notion of Aboriginal agency against the Indigenous claimants themselves: as evidence of 
continued survival and struggle for land, the petition was (mis)-interpreted as proof of the 
extinguishment of their rights to their lands.  
 
The entire approach taken by Olney J has been criticized for giving preference to white man’s 
history – not only his version of that history, but the way that he tells that history through the 
written word, discrediting any oral version of that history (read Indigenous versions) that may 
contradict the written version (Paul and Gray 2002). Only Black CJ, dissenting in the Full Federal 
Court, warned of the dangers of accepting colonial accounts of Aboriginal people in colonial 
times (Yorta Yorta, 2001, at 262-3), and only Gaudron and Kirby JJ, dissenting in the High Court 
and echoing the approach of Black CJ, could accommodate the effects of colonization on the 
claimant group (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 464-5). 
 
Justices Gaudron and Kirby, in their dissenting judgment in Yorta Yorta, disagreed with 
approaches taken at trial and in the Full Federal Court, insisting that they did not fully appreciate 
the intention of Parliament to acknowledge a history of dispossession and give protection to 
native title rights and interests in the NTA:  
 
So much was impliedly recognised in the Preamble to the Act which “sets out considerations 
taken into account by the Parliament”, including that Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders 
had been “progressively dispossessed of their lands” (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 463). 
 
The extent to which the approaches taken by the High Court in Yorta Yorta and Ward have been 
able to accommodate the effects of colonization on Indigenous claimant groups in other cases has 
varied according to the circumstances of those cases. Notably, in some recent cases reliance on 
the conception of the claimants’ connection to their ancestral lands as ‘spiritual’ has, to some 
extent, helped to address the impact of colonization and for some native title claimant groups has 
led to positive findings. For instance, in De Rose Wilcox, Sackville and Merkel JJ (confirming 
the Full Federal Court decision in Ward) found that:  
 
a spiritual connection and the performance of responsibility for land can be maintained even 
where Aboriginal people have been hunted off the land or it has become impracticable for them to 
visit. The Full Court said that physical presence is not essential in circumstances where it is no 
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longer practicable or access to traditional lands is prevented or restricted by European settlers (De 
Rose, 2003, at [418]).  
 
Their Honours further noted that this approach was not dissented from in the High Court on 
appeal in Ward. Similar conclusions were made in Daniel in relation to the continuing connection 
of both claimant groups to their lands: despite the substantial impact of European settlement that 
had affected the continued occupation on the land, Nicholson J in that case found that the 
Yindjibarndi and Ngarluma peoples had maintained a strong sense of connection to their lands 
(Daniel, 2003, at [421]-[422]).  
 
However, it is to be remembered that the acknowledgement of a spiritual connection to land does 
not fully accommodate the connection that Indigenous peoples have to their ancestral lands and 
that it is the land itself that has the spiritual significance for them. At most casting the connection 
between claimant groups and their lands as ‘spiritual’ has only mitigated some of the effects of 
colonization on these groups. It should not be forgotten that the reaffirmation of difference in 
Ward – stemming from the perceived differences in origin of Australian law and native title – has 
merely cast Indigenous property precepts as different and inferior to common law property 
precepts as well as common law conceptualizations of native title: native title as a bundle of 
rights is not the same as the full ownership of land. Arguably, the adoption of the occupation 
approach would have been more in line with the claimants’ own understanding of their 
relationship to their traditional lands, since on that approach the land itself would be the focal 
point of any enquiry into native title (North J in Ward, 2000, at 515). 
 
Stressing the spiritual nature of the connection that Indigenous peoples have to their traditional 
lands may further confine native title to ‘personal’ or ‘domestic’ rights and interests (as opposed 
to ‘economic’ or ‘trading’ rights) and in this way may limit the success of claims that would help 
Indigenous peoples to engage in commercial exploitation of any natural resources that may be 
present on their traditional lands. For instance in Daniel Nicholson J found that the only native 
title rights and interests that had survived the acquisition of sovereignty were those: 
 
not exercisable otherwise than in accordance with and subject to traditional laws and customs for 
personal, domestic and non-commercial purposes (including social, cultural, religious, spiritual 
and ceremonial purposes) (Daniel v Western Australia [2005] FCA 536 at [4]).  
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Notwithstanding that native title rights and interests can include hunting, fishing and gathering 
rights and interests under section 223(2) of the NTA, the decision in Yorta Yorta, by confining 
native title rights and interests to those that were in existence at the time of the acquisition of 
sovereignty, may make it all the more impossible to recognise the existence of rights to trade in 
resources. This problem had already been foreshadowed in the High Court decision in Yarmirr v 
Northern Territory (in relation to fishing rights) and in Ward (in relation to rights to minerals). 
Only in rare circumstances has a Court recognized the commercial rights of a native title claimant 
group, for example in Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria where North 
J recognized the claimants’ traditional rights to trade in eels.  
 
In most cases Australian courts have been unable to accommodate Indigenous forms of economic 
exchange. Indigenous practices have at best been misconstrued ‘as a type of primitive exchange’ 
and at worst re-constituted ‘as an absence of economic relations’ (Langton, Manzel and Palmer 
2006, p. 307). Indeed these cases illuminate another shortcoming of the native title regime. 
Australian courts have been prepared to say 
 
yes Aboriginal culture was of a type that was capable of supporting a system of laws about 
ownership and use of the lands but not so far to acknowledge that the system included trade in the 
resources in or on the lands, or even if Aboriginal people did trade in those resources it was only 
with each other and therefore not trade in the sense of western trade (McAvoy 2001, p. 4). 
 
In other cases, the effects of colonization have precluded a positive finding of native title 
completely. For instance, in Risk, the effects of colonization on the claimant group led Mansfield 
J to conclude (echoing the High Court majority in Yorta Yorta) that ‘the current Larrakia society, 
with its laws and customs, has not carried forward the traditional laws and customs of the 
Larrakia people so as to support the conclusion that those traditional laws and customs have had a 
continued existence and vitality since sovereignty’ (Risk, 2006, at [13]). By contrast, in Bennell v 
Western Australia Wilcox J was able to distinguish the facts in that case from those in Yorta 
Yorta. Finding that the Noongar people held native title over the claim area situated in the Perth 
region, he noted that ‘unlike the Yorta Yorta people … the south-west community did not suffer a 
cataclysmic event that totally removed them from their traditional country. Families were pushed 
around, and broken up … [h]owever, people continued to identify with their Aboriginal heritage’ 
26  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 
(Bennell v Western Australia, 2006, at 265-6). However, on appeal, the Full Federal Court 
disagreed with this approach. Justices Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield found the requirement in 
Yorta Yorta that ‘acknowledgment and observance of … laws and customs must have continued 
substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty’ itself contained an acknowledgement of the effects 
of European settlement on native title: ‘European settlement is what justifies the expression 
“substantially uninterrupted” rather than “uninterrupted”. It explains why it is that the common 
law will recognise traditional laws and customs that are not exactly the same as they were at 
settlement’ (Bodney v Bennell, 2008, at 109). But that was as far as the Full Court would go to 
accommodate the effects of white settlement. The Full Court found that: 
 
if … there has been a substantial interruption, it is not to be mitigated by reference to white 
settlement. The continuity enquiry does not involve consideration of why acknowledgment 
and observance stopped. If this were not the case, a great many Aboriginal societies would be 
entitled to claim native title rights even though their current laws and customs are in no 
meaningful way traditional. Yorta Yorta … would have been decided differently … (Bodney 
v Bennell, 2008, at 109). 
 
The question that remains is whether the results in these cases are the inevitable consequences of 
Mabo: was Mabo only intended to address some but not all of the effects of colonization that had 
contributed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples’ lands? Clearly the acceptance of the idea 
of extinguishment of native title, the framing of conditions on which native title could be 
extinguished and the limits placed on the availability of compensation for past acts of 
extinguishment, suggest that there were certain events in history that the Court found could not be 
undone. But it is also to be remembered that each of the judgments in Mabo took a different 
approach to these issues. As for the requirement for a continued connection to the land as proof of 
native title, the majority judgments in Mabo differed again. Notably it was only Brennan J (in the 
often referred to ‘tide of history’ passage) who clearly postulated the requirement that to retain 
native title, a claimant group must still have a connection to their ancestral lands through 
continued observance and acknowledgement of their ‘traditional’ laws and customs (Mabo, 1992, 
at 60). Moreover, according to Brennan J’s formulation such a connection (so far as practicable) 
must have been ‘substantially maintained’ (Mabo, 1992, at 59). By contrast, Toohey J focused on 
the nature of the traditional title as ‘rooted in physical presence. That the use of land was 
meaningful [in relation to a society's economic, cultural or religious life] must be proved but it is 
to be understood from the point of view of the members of the society’ (Mabo, 1992, at 188). His 
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approach appears to be focused on proof of continuity of the community over time and suggests 
that it might be sufficient to maintain native title even if the group has lost its traditional customs 
(Webber 1995, p. 19).  
 
It may be important to point out here that the different views on these issues that were being 
expressed in 1992 when Mabo was decided may need to be understood within the broader 
historical context of that decision and more specifically within the interpretive framework of each 
judge. Moreover, the differences in approach in Mabo meant that there were alternative 
approaches available to future courts on how to resolve these differences. If the law was to 
continue to develop in the spirit of reconciliation, those approaches that offered the most 
protection to native title should have been followed. Given that these approaches were not 
followed in cases like Yorta Yorta and Ward, one explanation could be that the NTA now 
precludes their application. However, it is equally true that there was no unanimity in these cases 
either on the question of how the Act should apply. Both cases specifically related to the nature of 
the content and proof of native title. In Ward Lee J at trial had continued to postulate the common 
law understanding that native title was proprietary in nature, notwithstanding the provisions in the 
NTA. In Yorta Yorta Gaudron and Kirby JJ’s interpretation of the definition of native title in the 
NTA still enabled them to follow Toohey J’s formulation in Mabo of the standard of proof 
required to be met in order to succeed in a claim for native title. In their view ‘adaptations, 
alterations, modifications or extensions of laws previously acknowledged’ could fit within the 
definition of ‘traditional laws acknowledged’ in s 223(1)(a) of the NTA (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 
264). Moreover, while Gaudron and Kirby JJ found that the continuity of a community was 
important in determining whether current practices are part of its traditional laws and customs, 
they also found that: 
 
the question whether a community has ceased to exist is not one that is to be answered solely by 
reference to external indicia or the observations of those who are not or were not members of that 
community. The question whether there is or is not continuity is primarily a question of whether, 
throughout the period in issue, there have been persons who have identified themselves and each 
other as members of the community in question (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 264). 
 
Most notably in response to the stringent standard of proof that had been applied by Olney J at 
first instance (based on Brennan J’s approach in Mabo), Gaudron and Kirby JJ found that ‘[t]here 
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is nothing in … the definition of “native title” or “native title rights and interests” which requires 
that “traditional connection with the land ... [be] substantially maintained”’ (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 
466). The same argument could be made in response to the joint majority judgment in the High 
Court: there is nothing in the definition of native title in the NTA which requires that traditional 
connection with the land be ‘substantially uninterrupted’.     
 
Evidently, the NTA can be read in ways that could provide native title with more protection than 
it has been offered in Yorta Yorta and Ward. Thus, to understand why native title has not been 
adequately protected it may be necessary to look beyond the current law and at the wider 
political, social and historical context in which developments in this area of law have taken place. 
The lingering effects of old colonial approaches to history and Indigenous societies are 
particularly relevant here. The more recent developments in native title law may be lamented as 
just another example of the eternal return of colonialism in Australia. Indeed the conservative 
backlash in response to Mabo, and then subsequently in relation to Wik, most clearly 
demonstrates how old colonial constructions of Aboriginality are still prevalent in certain 
influential quarters of Australian society (Attwood 1996b; Marcus 1996). This backlash had its 
greatest influence on the native title regime, most notably through the amendments to the NTA in 
1998 that have further contributed to compounding the inferior status of native title in Australian 
law (Tehan 2003, p. 555). The unprecedented attacks on the High Court for their decisions in 
Mabo and Wik may also help to explain the more cautious approach of the High Court in cases 
such as Yorta Yorta and Ward, confining the recognition of native title to the much more fragile 
conceptualisation spelled out in those cases. It is also important to acknowledge the extensive 
resources poured into defending native title claims by public and private bodies alike, and the 
frequency with which claims are met with the response that native title has ceased to exist (or 
never existed in the first place). In Ward, the defendants devised arguments that were even more 
restrictive in scope than those that were finally accepted by the joint majority judgment, in an 
effort to convince the Court to reject the native title claim completely. Though the joint judgment 
did not accept these arguments, Callinan J (in dissent) did. Reminiscent of the old version of 
Australian history Callinan J opined: 
 
The first non-indigenous people who occupied this country brought with them their common and 
statutory law which had long included a doctrine of adverse possession and settled notions about 
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the use and occupation of land. These were closely connected ideas: land was to be used and 
enjoyed, and those who possessed, used and enjoyed the land should own it …  
 
Those early non-indigenous settlers also brought with them a knowledge of agriculture and 
husbandry, and of domestic, commercial and official construction of a kind completely different 
from that of the indigenous peoples. To the undiscriminating, and perhaps insensitive and 
unimaginative eyes of the former it must have appeared that much of this large continent was not 
in fact being used or enjoyed, or certainly not so in a way that was familiar. …  
 
The different conceptions [about land] held by the new settlers, much the stronger of the peoples, 
were bound to prevail. This was inevitable when those who were the more powerful had a well 
settled, long-standing body of property law in written texts, statutes and cases, and those whom 
they dispossessed depended for the assertions of their rights to occupy and use the land upon 
traditional oral customs and practices. …  
 
The problems for the indigenous people were compounded by the difficulty of finding any 
conceptual common ground between the common and statutory law of real property and 
Aboriginal law with respect to land. It seems likely that the first settlers would have regarded the 
two as incompatible, that whatever the Aboriginal peoples possessed by way of title to land was 
too foreign, fragile and elusive to withstand and survive the common law. Mabo (No2) was a 
brave judicial attempt to redress the wrongs of dispossession. But … “recognition” of native title 
… has no parallel in the common law. The Court has endeavoured to find a way of recognising, 
and to a degree protecting, that anomalous interest without unduly disturbing the law of Australian 
property. The results of this enterprise can hardly be described as satisfactory (Ward, 2002, at 395-
7). 
 
Furthermore in Yorta Yorta Callinan J accepted an interpretation of the word ‘traditional’ in the 
definition of native title in the NTA that confined native title rights and interests to those that were 
in existence at the time of the acquisition of British sovereignty, but limited the scope of their 
potential for adaptation and change since that time. Justice Callinan went so far as to say:  
 
The extent to which longstanding law and custom may evolve without ceasing to be traditional 
may raise difficult questions. The matter went uncontested in Yanner v Eaton, although for myself 
I might have questioned whether the use of a motor boat powered by mined and processed liquid 
fuel, and a steel tomahawk, remained in accordance with a traditional law or custom, particularly 
one of alleged totemic significance (Yorta Yorta, 2002, at 493). 
 
The extensive litigation in cases such as these shows how contentious native title continues to be 
for those who perceive their interests to be ‘under threat’ by a native title claim. It also shows 
how much resistance there can be to engaging in negotiation in native title cases, as an alternative 
to the adversarial processes of litigation, notwithstanding the provisions for agreement-making 
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under the NTA. Indeed in Ward Western Australia decided to hold off engaging in negotiations 
for an agreement with the Miriuwung Gajerrong traditional owners until after the High Court’s 
decision on appeal (Yu 1999, p. 25-6). In light of the High Court’s decision (by contrast to that of 
Lee J at first instance) this proved to be an effective strategy, since the government’s leverage 
increased as the claimant group’s native title rights and interests were diminished. Even in the 
case of Yorta Yorta an agreement (though limited in its scope by comparison to what would have 
been the outcome if the native title claim had succeeded) may have been reached between the 
Yorta Yorta Nation Aboriginal Corporation (‘YYNAC’) and the State of Victoria (Seidel and 
Hetyey 2004), but New South Wales has not engaged with such a process at all. Moreover, the 
general public response to native title claims also appears to be one of resistance as evidenced by 
media reports that Wilcox J’s decision in Bennell v Western Australia would have meant the 
closure of public access to beaches. Instances such as these show how divided we are as a nation 
on the issue of native title and how far we still need to go to adopt the spirit of – let alone achieve 
– reconciliation in Australia in this area of law.  
 
However, it may be more accurate to interpret the High Court’s approach in Yorta Yorta and 
Ward as exalting certain anthropological perceptions of Aboriginality – the image of Indigenous 
peoples living in a tribal state untouched by civilization, the timeless Aborigine. It may be no 
coincidence that this image of Aboriginality, the one that has been most valorized in the 
Australian popular consciousness, is also the one that has found most protection in native title 
law. And to a certain degree it is this image of Aboriginality that is favoured among certain 
historians – even those who subscribe to new historical methods and practices. This has been 
most patently clear in the tacit support that has been given by some to the limitations that have 
been placed on native title recognition – most notably the requirement that there be continuous 
association with the land based on past traditions (Webber 1995, p. 19; Attwood 1996a, p. 
xxxvii).  
 
Of course, even when Mabo was decided it was never envisaged that it would provide a solution 
for all Indigenous peoples. In fact it had been predicted that only 5% of the Indigenous population 
would benefit from the decision (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 1993, p. 16). 
Indeed the opposition between ‘real’ Aborigines (whose native title has survived), and 
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dispossessed Aborigines, whose native title rights have been extinguished and can no longer be 
revived, had already been foreshadowed in the context of the statutory land rights that pre-dated 
Mabo. It is no coincidence that the former are statistically more likely to be found in the north of 
Australia and the latter in urban centres. For instance, in the statutory schemes Aborigines from 
the Northern Territory are referred to as ‘traditional’ Aborigines (Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) 
Act 1976 (Cth)), but in more settled areas such as New South Wales, the land rights regime is 
aimed primarily at dispossessed Aborigines (Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW)). However, 
as the more recent land reforms in the Northern Territory (Northern Territory National 
Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth)) and Queensland (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Land Amendment Act 2008 (Qld)) have shown, such regimes still fail to address the dispossession 
of those Indigenous peoples in urban centres, nor have they availed to protect Indigenous 
communal title to land (Watson 2008). 
 
In conclusion, it may appear from the more recent history of native title law that Mabo has turned 
out to be a lost opportunity to right the wrongs of dispossession and establish equality of 
treatment for Indigenous conceptions of property. Maybe that opportunity was never there to 
begin with. As more of the shortcomings of the native title regime become apparent so too does 
the need for additional remedial action (Pearson 2003; Dominello 2008a; Dominello 2008b). 
Crucial to these developments will be how Indigenous peoples are perceived and how aspirations 
for the nation are conceived. Whatever form that action may take, it is to be remembered (as the 
new historians have indeed reminded us) that any course of action taken now will continue to 
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